Complexities that arise from implementation of object-oriented concepts in C++ such as virtual dispatch and dynamic type casting have a racted the a ention of a ackers and defenders alike. Binary-level defenses are dependent on full and precise recovery of class inheritance tree of a given program. While current solutions focus on recovering single and multiple inheritances from the binary, they are oblivious to virtual inheritance. Conventional wisdom among binary-level defenses is that virtual inheritance is uncommon and/or support for single and multiple inheritances provides implicit support for virtual inheritance. In this paper, we show neither to be true.
INTRODUCTION
Recovering high-level semantic information from binaries has strong security relevance in areas such as vulnerability detection, controlow integrity (CFI) [3, 4, 6, 14, 25, 29, 33, 35] , decompilation [2, 5, 8, 17, 31, 32] and memory forensics [12] . In particular, recovery of object-oriented semantics (e.g., class hierarchy) is key to C++ binary-level defenses (e.g., [9, 11, 14, 23, 24] ).
Traditional C++ binary analysis solutions have focused on constructor analysis [6, 7] , destructor analysis [13] , overwrite analysis [23] , and VTable analysis [14, 24, 34] in order to recover at least a partial class hierarchy tree (CHT). While prior solutions have focused on recovering single and multiple inheritances in the binary, virtual inheritance-an important feature of C++ languagehas been ignored. From a security standpoint, some key questions arise: 1) How common is virtual inheritance? 2) Is virtual inheritance relevant for security? 3) Does support for single and multiple inheritance implicitly cover virtual inheritance? Virtual inheritance is not uncommon: Virtual inheritance in C++ facilitates implementation of key design ideas, and has been used in prominent and widely-used programs (e.g., libstdc++). Our study comprising of 1128 C++ binaries (libraries + executables) found 11% of the libraries to contain virtual inheritance. Widelyused libraries such as libstdc++ utilize virtual inheritance to prevent duplication of stream objects in the IO-related classes. Because libstdc++ is linked to all C++ programs, virtual inheritance can be commonly found in most C++ programs' memory. Security relevance of virtual inheritance: Failure to handle virtual inheritance results in severe security aws. Current binarylevel CFI defenses against C++ virtual dispatch a acks extract the VTables in a binary and given a callsite, they construct a policy that allows the callsite to target a strict subset of polymorphic virtual functions derived from the class inheritance tree. Without speci c mechanisms to handle virtual inheritance, current solutions either su er from false negatives or false positives in the inheritance tree. In case of Marx [23] , compiler-generated "construction VTables" (transient VTables used in construction of objects with virtual bases) are incorrectly included in the inheritance tree as regular VTables (i.e., VTables that represent a class) thereby resulting in false positives in the inheritance tree. Whereas in the case of VCI [7] legitimate inheritance relationships arising due to virtual inheritance are completely missed due to the lack of support for virtual inheritance. VCI is testament to the fact that support for single and multiple inheritance does not implicitly cover virtual inheritance. Both false positives and negatives result in inaccuracies in resulting CFI policies.
Unlike single and multiple inheritances, recovery of virtual inheritance poses signi cant technical challenges. First, thanks to the is-a property, reference to a derived object is also a legitimate reference to its virtual base object. However, by de nition, a single copy of the virtual base is retained in the entire inheritance tree. As such, o set of the virtual base subobject from a derived class object and an intermediate class subobject (i.e., object of a class between the derived class and the virtual base class in the inheritance tree) could be di erent. Any binary-level static object-layout analysis that intends to capture virtual bases must take into account various o sets from di erent derived objects in an inheritance tree. Second, the ABI [1] necessitates additional structures and elds, e.g., virtual base o set (vbase-o set), virtual call o set (vcall-o set), construction VTables, etc. in order to implement virtual inheritance. ese elds and structures introduce complexities in implementation that require special handling. Finally, virtual bases are allocated at the end of all the non-virtual bases in an inheritance (sub) tree. It is therefore important for a virtual inheritance recovery solution to delineate between non-virtual and (one or more) virtual bases in an object's memory.
In this paper, we rst show that virtual inheritance is not uncommon. To this end, we perform a comprehensive study of C++ binaries in the default installation of Ubuntu Linux 18.04 distribution and report that 11% of C++ libraries contain virtual inheritance. Further, we design a robust virtual inheritance recovery engine that pivots on the ABI de nitions (both Itanium for gcc and clang, and MSVC for Microso Visual Studio). Our solution is tolerant to compiler variations including optimizations. Our class inheritance engine codenamed VirtAnalyzer employs object-o set analysis that can identify virtual bases in a derived object with a high level of precision. VirtAnalyzer is able to successfully recover up to 100% of virtual bases and 95.5% of intermediate bases in the virtual inheritance tree.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) We present simple and e cient algorithms to detect presense of and recover virtual inheritance in a given C++ binary. Our techniques are ABI-based, and so are largely una ected by the speci c compiler and/or optimizations (except in cases where entire classes are removed by the compiler). (2) We show that virtual inheritance is not uncommon in C++ binaries with signi cant security concerns. It cannot be ignored. (3) We presented a sample a ack that depicts how false positives in the CHT due to virtual inheritance can be exploited despite state-of-the-art defenses. We further demonstrate that O(n 2 ) a ack surface manifests where n is the depth of the inheritance subtree with a virtual base.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the technical details needed to understand the remainder of the paper. Because the Itanium ABI is widely used (adhered to by gcc and clang) and ABI is openly available [1] , we use it as a focal point of our work. However, our work also supports MSVC ABI (see Section 5.5).
Running Example
We will use the running example in Listing 1 throughout the paper. Class A is inherited virtually by each of classes B and C. Class D inherits from classes B and C to form what is popularly known as the "diamond" structure. Because class A is inherited virtually, only one copy of the subobject of A is retained in the object of class D. Listing 2 shows the disassembly of D's constructor. All code examples in this paper were compiled using GCC 7.3 with optimization ag O0, except otherwise stated 
Key De nitions
Below we provide key de nitions that recur throughout the paper. ese are consistent with the Itanium ABI [1] .
Polymorphic class: is a class that declares at least a virtual function or derives directly or indirectly from a class that is polymorphic. Direct and Indirect base: Class DB is said to be the direct base of class C if C inherits directly from DB. Whereas, class IB is said to be an indirect base of class C if there exists at least one class M such that M inherits from IB and C inherits from M. Primary and Secondary VTables: Primary VTable of a class C contains the virtual functions de ned in C. It is shared with C's primary base. C has a secondary VTable associated with each of its secondary bases. e secondary VTables of a class are laid out immediately a er the primary VTable, as a result, the address of a secondary VTable is always greater than that of its primary VTable. Object and Subobject: An object of class C contains entries for vptrs to C's VTables and entries for all non-static member variables of C. A subobject in C's object belong speci cally to C or one of its base classes and it contains a vptr and non-static member variables de ned in C or the base class. For instance, Figure 4 shows that C's object contains two subobjects. 
Virtual Inheritance
Virtual inheritance is the solution to the "diamond" structure problem, wherein multiple inheritance results in multiple copies of a base class' member variable(s) in the object of a derived class. In Listing 1, since B and C virtually inherit from A, the compiler is instructed to keep a single copy of A in D. e object of D is such that there is exactly one copy of A's subobject, which is placed at the end of D's object. Virtual inheritance is achieved by pre xing the base class name in the class signature with the keyword "virtual".
Categories of Virtual
Inheritance. e Itanium ABI speci es two categories of virtual inheritance (see 2.5.3 in [1] ). We handle both cases in this work.
• Virtual Bases Only: is is the case where all the base classes of a derived class are virtual (depicted in Figure 1-1 ). e virtual bases may have non-virtual bases. e derived class has a secondary VTable for each of its virtual bases. 
Virtual
Base O set. Every class which inherits from a virtual base, either directly or indirectly, has a "vbase-o set". It is the o set of a virtual base subobject from a derived object. is value is used when a member variable in the virtual base subobject needs to be accessed from a pointer pointing to a derived object. It is also used during the initialization of the secondary VTable corresponding to a virtual base. e VTable of a class has a vbaseo set eld for each of its virtual bases. For instance, as shown in Figure 2 , D has two vbase-o sets of values 0x20 (o set from D's subobject to A-in-D's subobject) and 0x10 (o set from C-in-D's subobject to A-in-D's subobject). in D's object as A's subobject. erefore, there is the need for another VTable corresponding to B-in-D that has the correct vbaseo set(0x20) and the virtual functions associated with B (this is because while constructing B's subobject in D, B's virtual functions should be accessible not those of D), as well as special constructors and destructors which access the construction VTables. Figure 2 shows the elds of the two construction VTables in the running example (CV B-in-D, CV C-in-D). Every intermediate base class has an associated construction VTable. As shown in Table 1 , the construction VTable of an IntermediateBase-in-Derived has the vbase-o set, vcall-o set and o set-to-top of virtual bases associated with the derived, while the virtual functions, type info and o setto-top of non-virtual bases associated with the intermediate base. Figure 3 ). Every derived class with at least one direct or indirect virtual base class(es) has an associated VTT. e VTT is made up of pointers to the primary and seconday VTables of the derived class, and the primary and secondary construction VTables of its intermediate base classes. We refer to each complete object VTable pointers (i.e. group of primary and secondary VTable pointers of a class) within a VTT as SubVTTs. Basically, a VTT is made up of multiple subVTTs each pointing to a complete object VTable or a construction VTable. Only one of those subVTTs point to the VTable of the derived class which owns the VTT, while the others point to construction VTables.
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, there is need for special constructors (and destructors) to construct intermediate base subobjects in the derived object. e constructor of the derived class passes a pointer to the subVTT corresponding to the construction VTable of the IntermediateBase-in-Derived to the special constructor as a second hidden argument. It then initializes the intermediate base subobject by accessing the subVTT (Listing 2, lines 7 and 13) as opposed to initializing with immediate values in the case of single and multiple inheritance.
Order of Object
Construction. We will explain this using the running example and Listing 2. First, the constructor of D constructs all its virtual bases, A in this case. Next B is constructed by calling the special constructor of B with the address of the subVTT corresponding to the construction VTable B-in-D as the second argument. e same is done for C. Finally, the vptrs of D are wri en into appropriate locations in the object starting with the primary vptr. is is also the same for VTables Figure 2 , a derived class does not share VTable with its virtual base (except the virtual base is either empty or nearly empty). Note that only the VTable corresponding to the virtual base has vcallo set elds.
SECURITY IMPACT OF VIRTUAL INHERITANCE 3.1 Study: Virtual Inheritance in Real-World Programs
Virtual inheritance in C++ has received very li le a ention. Prior e orts have focused on single and multiple inheritances, therefore, support for handling virtual inheritance is missing in both sourcecode-level solutions [11, 16, 19, 28, 33] and binary-level solutions [7, 13, 21, 23, 30] . While it is true that virtual inheritance in C++ is not as common as single or multiple inheritance, we conducted a study in order to understand how (un)common virtual inheritance is in realworld programs. We evaluated 1128 C++ binaries on Ubuntu 18.04 Linux distribution and found 11% of the libraries with instances of virtual inheritance ranging from 1 to 27. Our approach for detecting virtual inheritance in a binary is described in detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Findings of our study are tabulated in Table 2 . Notably, we found that virtual inheritance is prevalent in both libraries and executables including the libstdc++ library and mysql database engine. State-of-the-art binary analysis tools that rely on inference of class hierarchy like Marx [23] and VCI [7] do not recover virtual inheritance, which is necessary for enforcing precise CFI policies. 
False Positives and False Negatives in State-of-the-art Binary Level Solutions
We consider state-of-the-art binary analysis tools which reconstruct high level semantics from the binary. Table 3 shows the weaknesses (introduction of either false positives or false negatives) of the solutions in handling virtual inheritance. As representative solutions, we also provide a detailed description of how VCI [7] , SmartDec [13] and MARX [23] behave when virtual inheritance is present in a binary. Marx Overview: Marx is a binary-level solution that defends against abuse of virtual dispatch mechanism in C++. In a nutshell, for a given C++ virtual callsite, Marx identi es all the polymorphic functions that can be invoked at that callsite, and instruments the binary to allow only those functions. Allowable polymorphic functions are recovered by performing overwrite analysis which identi es sets of vptrs that get overwri en in an object during construction or destruction. Marx groups classes into sets wherein each set represents a class inheritance sub-tree with no particular inheritance order. Detailed description of Marx can be found in the paper [23] .
For the running example, Marx recovers six complete-object VTables (including construction VTables). One VTable each for A, B, C and D and one construction VTable each for B-in-D and C-in-D. Marx does not make any distinction between VTables and construction VTables. In other words, Marx will interpret construction VTables to be representations of legitimate classes in the binary. For the running example, 12 VTables (breaking them into primaries and secondaries) are recovered. Under O0 optimization, Marx groups all 12 into a single set, while for O2, there are 3 sets. e sets for O2 are: We see from Table 1 that the vbase-o set in the construction VTable B-in-D is greater than that in the VTable of B. If the construction VTable of B-in-D is used, line 4 of listing 4 retrieves a vbase-o set equal to 0x20 which is used to access the virtual base subobject at line 7.
is is clearly outside the bounds of B's object since the total size of B is 0x20. en lastly, an o set of 0x28 (0x20 + 0x8) from B's object is accessed at line 8 to get a member of the virtual base, and wri en in line 10. ese read and write operations occur outside B's object bounds. e failure of Marx to handle virtual inheritance (meaning that construction VTables are neither identi ed nor ltered out from inheritance sets) introduces an a ack surface for data corruption and arbitrary code execution under favorable circumstances. A detailed PoC a ack is provided in Section 5.3.
False Negatives in VCI and SmartDec.
VCI and SmartDec Overview: VCI and SmartDec are binary level class hierarchy recovery tools which a empt to reason about the direction of inheritance. VCI achieves this by performing constructor only analysis, while SmartDec performs constructor and destructor analysis. Both solutions analyze the order in which base class constructors and/or destructors are called from the derived class constructor/destructor. e analysis is done by simply scanning constructors, for instance, for assembly callsites that invoke other constructors. While VCI puts measures in place to lter out composed classes from the class hierarchy tree, SmartDec includes both composed and inherited classes in the class hierarchy tree.
Regular constructors are known to be functions which initialize vptrs as immediate values. As mentioned in subsection 2.3.4, special constructors used to construct intermediate bases in a virtual inheritance tree do not initialize any vptrs using immediate values. Considering the disassembly in Listing 2, VCI and SmartDec will recover A as the direct base of D and ignore B and C since they are unable to identify any calls to the constructors of B and C from the constructor of D. VCI keeps a metadata in the binary which maps every function to the set of class types it can be invoked on, therefore for each function in the example, a map that looks like this is generated: af() = {A,B,C,D}, bf() = {B}, cf() = {C}, df() = {D}. Say function bf() is to be invoked on an object of type D as shown in Listing 5, before the callsite at line 10, VCI checks if there is a class in the set for bf() which has a vptr equal to the vptr obtained at line 6. Since the vptr belong to D and D is not in the set, VCI raises a false violation alarm. SmartDec will behave similarly. Construction VTables vs Regular VTables. e layout of a construction VTable and a regular VTable are exactly the same. However, they have di erent purposes. erefore a trivial signaturebased approach is insu cient to distinguish between the two. Moreover, a class may contain multiple construction VTables depending on the depth of inheritance between the virtual base and the derived class. In order to build a clear and accurate class hierarchy tree, we must be able to group all the construction VTables of a class and associate them with the complete object VTable of that class.
SOLUTION OVERVIEW
Di erentiating Virtual and Non-virtual Bases. When a class derives from both virtual and non-virtual bases, its object and VTable contain subobjects and subVTables that correspond to both base classes. In order to correctly reconstruct the virtual inheritance tree, there is the need to identify non-virtual bases and lter them out.
High-Level Approach
e Figure 5 shows the overview of VirtAnalyzer. It incorporates analysis passes that tackle the challenges described above.
Discerning Relationship Between Mandatory and Optional
Fields.
ere is simply not enough information in one VTable alone to demarcate di erent optional and mandatory elds. erefore, our analysis combines information in multiple VTables. For instance, the o set-to-top value from a secondary VTable corresponding to a virtual base is equal in magnitude to the vbase-o set in the derived object's primary VTable. Such a correlation provides a strong con rmatory test to lter vbase o sets. Additionally, when the types are statically known during compilation, a vbase-o set is applied by the compiler during computation of vbase object's address from a derived object's address. By cross referencing potential o sets in the VTable with o seting code emi ed by the compiler, it is possible to identify optional o sets with a high level of con dence.
Identifying Construction VTables. VirtAnalyzer incorporates VTT analysis in order to identify construction VTables. e VTT is a key signi er of virtual inheritance in a binary, however, it is also crucial for di erentiating construction VTables from regular VTables. Per ABI mandate, the rst entry in a VTT always points to a regular VTable, and every other entry points to a construction VTable. VirtAnalyzer rst identi es VTTs in the binary and then isolates the regular and construction VTables from the rst and remaining entries in a VTT.
Grouping Construction VTables of a Class. e virtual function elds in all construction VTables of a class and its regular VTable are exactly the same. VirtAnalyzer takes advantage of this similarity to identify and group all the construction VTables belonging to a class.
Identifying Virtual and Non-virtual bases. Only virtual bases have associated optional elds such as vbase-and vcall-o set. Since VirtAnalyzer has already recovered the optional elds in an earlier step, it can lter out non-virtual bases from the inheritance tree. 
VIRTANALYZER
VirtAnalyzer consists of two phases, each of which consists of multiple sub-phases. We show the data used in each sub-phase in Table 4 . We explain the phases and their sub-phases below. [24] and DeClassi er [9] . Usually, VTables are referenced from the text section using immediate values that point to the read-only section. However, we found some libraries with immediate values in the text section pointing to the got section, which then point to the VTables. Such cases too were handled in our analysis. We recover immediate values and examine them to see if they are vptrs. An immediate value is a vptr if the output from dereferencing:
• vptr points to a function start address or the pure virtual function and • (vptr -DWORD SIZE) is either zero, or points to the data section (the typeinfo) and
• (vptr -DWORD SIZE*2) is zero (for a primary VTable) or a negative value (for a secondary VTable) We identify valid vptrs (for both primary and secondary VTables) and then group primary vptrs with their corresponding secondary vptrs to obtain the complete object VTable of each class. is was done by implementing the VTable grouping algorithm introduced in DeClassi er [9] .
is set of VTables also includes construction VTables.
Identifying
VTTs. VTTs, like VTables also reside in the read-only section of the binary. ey are the only structures whose entries are pointers to VTables. We identify VTTs by rst identifying structures that contain at least two entries of pointers to known VTables.
Unlike VTables whose o set-to-top eld or typeinfo eld can be used to separate two VTables which are laid out contiguously, VTTs only contain pointers, as a result, it is tricky to identify the boundaries between VTTs if they are laid out contiguously. In most cases, the VTables pointed to by a VTT are laid out immediately a er the VTT which makes it easy to know where a VTT ends. However, we found a few cases where VTTs of di erent classes are laid out contiguously. In these cases there is the possibility of wrongly grouping those multiple VTTs as one VTT. To address this, we take advantage of how VTT entries are ordered.
Notice from Figure 3 that the VTT of D starts with the vptr for D's VTable, followed by all the construction VTables (this means the second entry belongs to a construction VTable), and ends with D's secondary VTables. We also noticed that construction VTables are laid out a er their Derived VTables. We rst store the values of the rst and second entries of a VTT and continue down the VTT. We say that the previous entry found is the last entry in a VTT if the value of the current entry is either less than the rst entry (the last entry should be greater than the rst since it belongs to a secondary VTable) or greater than the second entry (the last entry should be less then the second since construction VTables are laid out a er the derived VTable). Algorithm 1 shows how VTTs are identi ed.
Grouping subVTTs.
A VTT has pointers to a VTable and one or more construction VTables. We refer to a group of pointers to each of these complete object VTables as subVTT. e rst subVTT in a VTT points to the regular VTable of the derived class, while the other subVTTs point to its construction VTables. We di erentiate regular VTables from construction VTables by looking at their subVTT position in the VTT. To identify subVTTs, we start Algorithm 1 IdentifyAVTT. 1 : procedure I AVTT(addr, nex tV T T I ndex ) 2:
pt r ← et pt r At Addr (addr ) 3: if is I nSe ment ( pt r, "dat a") then 4:
if isAV al idV T abl e( pt r ) then 5:
newV T T ← ∅ 6: newV T T .append (addr ) 7: nex t Ent r ← et N ex tV T T Ent r (addr ) 8:
while nex t Ent r ! = −1 do 9:
nex tV pt r ← et pt r At Addr (nex t Ent r ) 10:
if nex tV pt r < pt r then 11:
br eak 12:
end if 13:
if isAV al idV T abl e(nex tV pt r ) then 14:
newV T T .append(nex t Ent r ) 15 end if return nex tV T T I ndex 26: end procedure scanning a VTT from the beginning. Anytime we nd a pointer to a primary VTable, we create a new subVTT, and all secondary VTable found (before the next primary VTable) are grouped together. We are able to prevent grouping the secondary VTables of the derived class with the last construction VTable because the secondary VTables' addresses will be less than those of the construction VTables. Algorithm 2 presents the speci c steps in grouping subVTTs. or der ed pt r ← ∅ 3:
for each addr in aV T T do 4:
or der ed pt r .append (addr ) 5: end for 6: or der ed pt r .sor t () 7: ere is the possibility of recovering false VTables and this will invariably result in recovering false VTTs. A group of pointers may point to recovered false VTables, we will wrongly identify this as a VTT. However, by recovering and verifying the vbase-o set they contain, we will realize that they are invalid. e vbase-o set a class is also instrumental in recovering its virtual bases. Algorithm 3 shows the steps used in this sub-phase. e vbase-o set is one of the optional elds a VTable may contain depending on whether it is in a virtual inheritance tree or not. e number of vbase-o sets a derived class has is equal to the number of its virtual bases. Since a VTable can contain multiple vbaseo sets, we recover the rst vbase-o set by deferencing the third Dword from the vptr (upward direction) and then we go up the VTable one Dword at a time to recover the rest. As we recover each vbase-o set, we verify it. is is done by comparing it with the o set-to-top values in the secondary VTables from the rst to the last. If the current vbase-o set is not equal to the negative value of the o set-to-top of current secondary VTable, we assume the base corresponding to that VTable is not a virtual base, then we move to the next secondary VTable. We stop scanning for vbase-o set when the number of Dwords above the vptr checked is equal to the number of secondary VTables. We must nd at least one matching vbase-o set and o set-to-top to conclude that the subVTT is valid. If we do not nd any valid subVTT in a VTT, we discard the VTT. end for 13: end procedure 5.1.5 Mapping Construction VTables to Regular VTables. As stated in section 2.3.4, only the rst subVTT in a VTT belong to the VTable of the derived class, the other subVTTs belong to construction VTables of IntermediateBase-in-Derived. We use this information to di erentiate a construction VTable from a regular VTable. In this sub-phase, we identify the corresponding complete object VTable of every construction VTable. One or more construction VTables can map to one complete object VTable. For instance, in the running example, we map the construction VTable of B-in-D to the VTable of B. e mapping is constructed based on the observation that the function pointers in a complete object VTable and its corresponding construction VTables are exactly the same. To construct the mapping, we sum up the function pointers in each VTable and use that as the key in a dictionary. A regular VTable and its corresponding construction VTables will have the same key.
is mapping is needed while building the virtual inheritance tree.
Identifying Constructors and Destructors.
Constructors and destructors are where vptr initializations take place, for both object construction and destruction. We identify constructors and destructors, using the same approach employed by existing solutions. A function is said to be a constructor or destructor if it initializes an immediate value which points to a known VTable. register or memory location to another. We use this information to identify and retrieve the hidden arguments (this pointer and/or subVTT address) passed to regular constructors and destructors as well as the special constructors and destructors. We also keep track of call instructions which will be used in phase 2 of the analysis to identify virtual and intermediate bases.
Phase 2: Recovering Bases
We explain steps to recover virtual and intermediate bases using Figure 1 . Diagram 1 has only direct virtual bases, diagram 2 has 2 direct virtual base, while diagram 3 has one indirect virtual base. e non-virtual base in diagram 2 is recovered by the well studied class hierarchy recovery approach. We discuss the approach to recover the virtual bases in diagrams 1 and 3, as well as the approach to recover the intermediate bases B and C in diagram 3. Diagram 3 is the same as the running example whose disassembly is given in Listing 2 In order to identify a virtual base, we scan the constructor of the derived base for calls to other constructors, we then analyze the o sets added to the this pointer before the calls are made. If an o set equals any vbase-o set found in the derived class' primary VTable, we conclude that the constructor being called belongs to a virtual base of the derived class. Lastly, we retrieve the primary vptr corresponding to the identi ed virtual base and then record it as a virtual base vptr.
Recovering Intermediate Bases.
A special constructor is used to construct intermediate bases, virtual or non-virtual. is special constructor has three major distinctions from a regular constructor. It takes two default argument, this pointer and subVTT address (lines 7 and 13 of Listing 2), unlike the regular constructors whose only default argument is the this pointer. e sub-VTT address contains pointers to the construction VTable of the intermediate-in-derived. Second, it does not call the constructors of any of its virtual bases (they are called by the classes that derive from it). ird, it does not initialize its vptrs using immediate values, rather it accesses the subVTT it received as argument to get the vptrs needed for initialization. e third distinction will make the well known method of identifying constructors and destructors to fail since there is no vptr initialization. e calls on lines 10 and 16 of Listing 2 will be seen as just a function call. As a result, no relationship will be identi ed between B and D, and C and D. To address this problem, we make use of another information that the constructor of a derived class exposes. For every intermediate base, the derived class calls a special constructor which takes a subVTT address (an immediate value) as its second argument. erefore, to recover intermediate bases, we scan constructors for subVTT addresses. All those addresses represent individual intermediate bases. Once we have all the sub-VTT addresses, we retrieve their corresponding VTable addresses from the map obtained in subsection 5.1.5 and then record them as intermediate bases of the derived class.
Building Virtual Inheritance Tree.
Once we recover all classes involved in virtual inheritance, including their virtual and intermediate bases, we merge the results to construct the virtual inheritance tree of the binary. In order to show how our solution integrates with existing class inheritance recovery tools, we also build the overall inheritance tree which includes single, multiple and virtual inheritance.
Bypassing Marx: Exploitation of Virtual Inheritance
In this section we present a proof-of-concept a ack launched against a synthetic vulnerable program, Listing 7. e victim program is hardened with a Marx-like VTable protection policy. is policy ensures that only virtual functions from the set of classes related to the callsite type are allowed at runtime. e a ack is successful because Marx does not di erentiate between regular and construction VTables.
A ack
Model. e objective of this a ack is to execute arbitrary code. We assume that the a acker can bypass ASLR and stack protector. e rst assumption allows the a acker to identify the absolute addresses of suitable construction VTables to use in the a ack. Bypassing ASLR to reveal such information is possible as shown in the literature [10, 18] . Once the address of a suitable construction VTable has been found, there is a need to write it into appropriate location in the object. Our PoC exploits bu er over ow vulnerability for this which is possible by bypassing stack protector. ere are works that show that bypassing stack protector is possible , for this reason we simply disable stack protector for this PoC. First, we identi ed the address of the construction VTable of Bin-D which has a vbaseo set of 0x20. Next, we exploited the bu er over ow vulnerability to corrupt the address point of object b. We over ow buf2 (line 22) into b such that the vptr of B (which has a vbaseo set of 0x10) is overwri en with that of the construction VTable of B-in-D. Recall that Marx will allow this since it does not di erentiate between a regular and a construction VTable. We show the disassembly of function B::callBaseFunc() in Listing 8. On line 3 of Listing 8, the vbaseo set is retrieved to locate A's subject in B. Because of the bu er over ow, a vbaseo set of 0x20 is retrieved thereby locating the subobject of A2 instead. As a result, line 7 locates the second virtual function in the VTable of A2 (execShell) and executes it.
PoC

Attack Surface Analysis
We present an analysis of the a ack surface that the presence of virtual inheritance introduces. e number of o sets that can be exploited increases with the number of construction VTables present in the binary, especially if they contain su cient unique o sets. Unique vbase-o set and o set-to-top values for representative realworld programs in our study is presented in Figure 6 . Results indicate that it is not uncommon for o set values to be in multiple hundreds, which in turn indicates potential for an a acker to perform memory corruption a acks multiple hundred bytes from an intended access.
In general, a ack surface increases with the number of construction VTables, which in turn increases exponentially with depth of inheritance. Table 5 presents the number of construction VTables for the running example (row 1) and increasing depths (up to n). Total number of construction VTables at depth n is:
Since each derived class in the virtual inheritance tree may have several varying object layouts, there is a high probability that an a acker will nd su cient unique o sets needed to carry out an attack. For instance, in mysqld, there are 6 unique virtual bases in the entire inheritance tree, however, we found 24 unique vbase-o sets and 24 unique o set-to-top values. Furthermore, in program's that use libraries such as libstdc++, inheriting from virtual bases (e.g., Stream class) will introduce additional construction VTables in a program's memory. As in Figure 1 -3 (depth 1) 2 E inherits from D (depth 2) 2+3 = 5 F inherits from E (depth 3) 2+3+4 = 9 X inherits from Y (depth n) 2+3+4+…+n+1 = (n + 1) − 1 VTable. Using the running example in Listing 1, we will explain the content of these structures and how they are used. e o set in a polymorphic object points to (in the case of multiple inheritance, one of) its VTable, the next o set points to its Vbtable. A Vbtable is created for every class (polymorphic or nonpolymorphic) that directly or indirectly inherits from a virtual base. Classes B, C and D in the running example all have Vbtables. B and C have one each and D has two, one for D's subobject (shared with B) and the other for C's subobject. e Vbtables are wri en to the object during construction and destruction.
Support for MSVC ABI
We recover virtual inheritance from a binary that follows the MSVC ABI implementation by rst recovering VTables, this process is the same for the Itanium ABI. Next, we recover Vbtables (Algorithm 4). Vbtables seem more di cult to precisely recover unlike VTables, however, we noticed that the rst entry in every Vbtable we found is a particular constant value. We used that constant value as a signature to recover them. We recover constructors and destructor next, by looking for functions which initialize vptrs (same for Itanium ABI). e rst Vbtable of a given type contains o set(s) to the virtual base(s) from the top of the object. erefore to identify virtual bases (Algorithm 5), we look for calls in constructors and destructors whose rst argument is the address of the object plus an o set contained in the rst Vbtable of the object type (similar to Itanium ABI 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We developed VirtAnalyzer as an IDA Python plugin that builds on top of DeClassi er, a class hierarchy inference engine for single and multiple inheritances. Currently, VirtAnalyzer can infer virtual inheritance from binaries that adhere to the Itanium ABI irrespective of the compiler used to compile the program, however, it can be easily extended to support other ABIs. We discuss how such extension can be done to support MSVC ABI. Also, our current implementation supports 64-bit architecture. e only modi cation needed to support 32-bit architecture will be to change the size of a Dword (from 8 bytes to 4 bytes).
VirtAnalyzer recovers all data structures used by scanning sections of the binary. VTables, VTTs, subVTTTs and vbase-o sets are recovered from the data section while constructors and destructors are recovered from the text section.
We aim to answer the following questions in our evaluation:
• How accurate can virtual inheritance tree be recovered from a stripped binary?
• How does the presence of virtual inheritance reduce the e ectiveness of state of the art binary level defenses like Marx? • How accurate can the overall class inheritance (single, multiple and virtual) tree be recovered?
All binaries were compiled with GCC 7.3.0 on Ubuntu 18.04 LTS running on Intel core i7 3.60GHz with 32GB RAM. VTTs (Table 6) were recovered from binaries without any alteration made to the default compiler ags, while, virtual and intermediate bases were recovered from binaries compiled with O0 optimization. We compared the results from our analysis with the ground truth. Ground truth (GT) for all the binaries except mysqld, mysqlbinlog and mysqlpump were obtained from GCC's compilation option -fdumpclass-hierarchy, which dumps a representation of the hierarchy of each class, including their VTable layout [15] and VTTs. e representation captures single, multiple and virtual inheritance. We parsed the output le containing the representation to build the ground truth hierarchy. Mysqld, mysqlbinlog and mysqlpump are together in a single package, therefore, to know their distinct inheritance trees, we analyzed RTTI structures in their binaries.
Binaries Evaluated. We only evaluated some of the programs we found to have virtual inheritance (Table 2) because the other binaries have their virtual bases as imported classes as such the vptrs found in their base class constructors point to the extern section of the binary. We cannot verify vptrs pointing to the extern section since the actual VTable is not in the binary, that makes it impossible for us to identity any relationship in that case. ere are also certain base classes whose regular VTables are not in the binary, but have one or more construction VTables. We use one of the construction VTables to represent such classes. Note that this is needed only to construct the hierarchy. Since we know which VTables are construction VTables, they can be easily removed from the class hierarchy in order to enforce a security policy.
VTT Recovery
We report the number of distinct VTTs recovered from binaries in Table 6 . VTTs are reliable indication of virtual inheritance in a given binary. VTTs could also be used as a basis for comparing two binaries for similarity. Recovering a su cient number of VTTs from two binaries and analyzing their entries can indicate if they are similar or not. Lastly, VTTs can be reliably used to verify VTables, and to di erentiate them from construction VTables. As shown in the table, the number of VTTs recovered range from 1 to 166. Table 7 shows our analysis result for virtual inheritance compared with the ground truth. First, we identi ed classes which have at least one virtual base. A er that, the number of direct bases and number of intermediate bases which those classes have was counted. It is possible to have a class with only virtual bases and no intermediate, that is the reason we have a column "0" under "Intermediate bases". We used ">1" to denote all other numbers of virtual and intermediate bases because most classes have 2 or less numbers of virtual and intermediate bases. e compiler may choose to eliminate an entire class from the compiled binary, for Table 8 shows our result for the overall class inheritance recovery compared with the ground truth. e table shows the number of classes, most base classes (classes with no base), classes with single Table 7 : Table showing the no of classes in virtual inheritance tree. Column "#Classes with virt inh" show the no with at least one virtual base, direct or indirect, "0" shows the no with no intermediate base , "1" shows the no with 1 virtual or intermediate base, ">1" shows no with 2 or more virtual or intermediate bases, "#matching" shows the no whose bases were correctly recovered, "#over-est" shows no that we recovered more bases than the GT, "#under-est" shows no that we recovered less bases than the GT, "#not found" shows no with virt inh which we did not recover, "#not existing" shows no which we recovered but not in GT. Under "Intermediate bases", some entries have "N/A", this is because those programs have no class with an intermediate base. 
Virtual Inheritance Recovery
Overall Class Inheritance Recovery
base, classes with multiple bases and classes in virtual inheritance tree for GT and VirtAnalyzer. We recorded an average precision of 99.8% and 99.3% overall hierarchy for libraries and executables respectively. Compared to the total class hierarchy from the ground truth, we recovered an average of 66.5% and 82% for libraries and executables respectively. Most of the missing classes come from Boost libraries.
Comparison with Marx
We compare VirtAnalyzer with Marx, by considering the number of classes in virtual inheritance tree which Marx and VirtAnalyzer recovered. We a empted to do similar comparisons with VCI and SmartDec. However, VCI is not open sourced and the authors did not release the source code to us. We compiled a version of Smart-Dec that we found on GitHub, but the tool does not do what the paper describes. It tries to recover source code from a binary rather than recover class hierarchy. Marx groups classes into sets while we assign direction of inheritance to every class. To achieve a fair comparison, we evaluated the number of distinct virtual inheritance trees which we recovered. 
RELATED WORK
VCI, MARX and SmartDec focus on recovering single and multiple inheritance from a C++ binary. VCI analyses constructors to recover single and multiple inheritance tree. e constructor of a derived class calls the constructors of its base classes, therefore VCI uses this order information to identify base classes of a derived class. It does not consider virtual inheritance. Marx is slightly similar to VCI, however, it uses a more intuitive approach. During calls to base class constructors or destructors, the vptr within the derived class object gets overwri en. Only vptrs of related classes can be overwri en. Marx analyses vptr overwrites to group related classes. Its weakness is in its inability to di erentiate between a constructor and destructor which makes it impossible to assign direction of inheritance. Marx also does not reason about virtual inheritance, it simply groups vptrs for construction VTables and complete object VTables together.
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OOAnalyzer takes a di erent approach in recovering high level semantics in C++ programs. It does not rely on VTables which makes it possible to consider both polymorphic and non-polymorphic classes. However, this makes it hard to recover inheritance since vptr initialization is a strong indication of class relationships.
Katz et al. [21] proposed an approach to statically determine the possible targets of virtual function calls. is is achieved by rst identifying object tracelets, a statically constructed sequence of operations performed on an object. ese object tracelets are then used to train a statistical language model (SLM) for every type. e resulting ensemble of SLMs is used to generate a ranking of their most likely types, from which the likely targets of dynamic dispatches are deduced. Basically, the ensemble of SLMs is used to measure the likelihood that sets of tracelets share the same source, those set of tracelets are grouped together, which then form the basis for predicting possible targets of virtual function calls. e grouping of object types is similar to what Marx does.
DeClassi er [9] implements several techniques to recover class hierarchy information from optimized binaries. ese techniques include constructor/destructor analysis, overwrite analysis and object layout analysis. It achieves a high precision and accuracy on optimized binaries, however, it also does not consider virtual inheritance.
SECRET [35] enforces the "What-You-Target-Is-Not-What-You-Execute" (WYTINWYX) policy to thwart a acks that depend on code pointer harvesting. To build this policy, it recovers several high level information from the binary such as VTables, jump tables, code pointer constants and so on.
VTPin [25] ensures that the vptr wri en into an object through the compiler code does not get overwri en at runtime. is is to defend against VTable hijacking a acks caused by use-a er-free vulnerabilities. VTPin recovers RTTI information from the binary to validate a vptr and then pins it so that it does not get overwri en.
VTint [34] protects against VTable hijacking a acks. It rst recovers VTables and virtual function dispatches in the binary, and then instruments the binary with security checks to ensure the integrity of VTables used at every virtual function dispatch.
vfGuard [24] is a binary level defense that protects virtual function callsites. It statically analyzes the binary to recover VTables as well as function o sets speci ed at callsites. It uses this information to enforce a CFI policy that restricts virtual dispatch targets to only functions at the same o set within VTables as the static o set speci ed at callsite.
VTable Pointer Separation (VPS) [37] is a binary level defense that implements CFIXX's Object Type Integrity on the binary level. It performs static and dynamic analysis and runtime instrumentation to identify the exact target vptr allowable at a given virtual callsite at runtime.
CONCLUSION
Previous binary level class hierarchy recovery solutions have made no a empt to recover the virtual inheritance tree of a program. In this work, we show the security implications of the failure to include virtual hierarchy in the overall inheritance tree. We also present simple, but e cient algorithms to recover virtual inheritance in a C++ binary.
